Small tidbits and Sparks of wisdom

Part 1A —

מגן אברהם הלכות סוכה סימן תרל״ז ס״ק ג׳

מבואר הא דנוהגים לעשות סוכה בחו״ל, ואילו בארץ שאינם מחויבים בזה דיני עבדים, גם למ״ד גזל עכו״ם אסור — לא שרי אלא פסול של מצוה הבא בעבירה.

אולם מביא דברי היראים דאפילו למ״ד גזל עכו״ם מותר, מ״מ לא היו לכם.

וכפי הנראה קשה לרש״י הנ״ל דהקרקע הרי אינו שלו, ע״כ לא נתן להם הקרקע בקנין. ע״כ.

מחצית השקל ד״ה ואע״ג

והא דנוהגים דברי המגן אברהם, דרש״י לטעמיה במס׳ סנהדרין (והוא לעיל) דגזל עכו״ם הוא רק מדרבנן, ולכן ליכא פסול מצוה הבא בעבירה.

אמנם מקשה לדעת הרמב״ם דגזל עכו״ם אסור מן התורה, שפיר איכא פסול מצוה הבא בעבירה.

ואפילו לדעת רש״י דליכא פסול מצוה הבא בעבירה, מ״מ יש איסור גזל ונשאר בצ״ע.

Part 1B — Understanding the Issue

The discussion concerns a סוכה ברשות הרבים — a sukkah erected on public property.

The Rema distinguishes between building such a sukkah לכתחילה and its status בדיעבד. Even though one should not initially erect a sukkah on public property without permission, nevertheless:

מיהו בדיעבד יצא — after the fact, one fulfills the mitzvah.

The Magen Avraham raises a deeper issue. Public property belongs to and is available for the use of the entire public. Even if some people consent to the sukkah being there, that does not necessarily establish permission from everyone who possesses a right to use that property.

This raises the question of גזל — unauthorized use of another’s property, as well as the concept of מצוה הבאה בעבירה — performing a mitzvah through an aveirah.

The Machatzis HaShekel discusses the distinction between the positions of Rashi and the Rambam concerning גזל עכו״ם. Even where there may not be a technical פסול of מצוה הבאה בעבירה, the underlying איסור גזל can still remain.

This produces an important distinction: a sukkah may possibly remain technically kosher בדיעבד, while the question of whether one may recite a ברכה in that sukkah remains separate.

Part 2 — The Modern Restaurant Sukkah

This discussion creates a very practical modern question.

A restaurant builds a sukkah outside its establishment during Sukkos. However, instead of placing the sukkah entirely on its own property, it puts the sukkah on a public sidewalk or city street.

Assume that the restaurant has no permit and has received no permission from the municipality to occupy that public space.

This is not merely a theoretical violation. The sukkah may occupy part of the sidewalk that pedestrians ordinarily use. People may be forced to walk around it, the available sidewalk may become narrower, and some members of the public may actually be annoyed that public property has been taken over for the private commercial benefit of a restaurant.

A customer now comes to this restaurant during Chol HaMoed and wants to eat a meal in the sukkah.

The first question is straightforward: Is the sukkah itself kosher?

There is room to argue from the Rema that although the sukkah should never have been erected there לכתחילה, nevertheless בדיעבד יצא. Its unauthorized location does not necessarily mean that the physical sukkah becomes completely invalid.

But that leads to a second and more difficult question:

Can the customer make the ברכה of לישב בסוכה?

That question is not necessarily answered simply by declaring the sukkah kosher בדיעבד.

The Magen Avraham’s discussion suggests that כשרות הסוכה and ברכת לישב בסוכה must be considered separately. If the sukkah occupies קרקע של רבים — property belonging to the public without authorization, there may remain an איסור connected with using that property even though the sukkah itself is technically sufficient for the mitzvah.

The restaurant case arguably sharpens the issue. The restaurant is not simply using an empty area for a temporary private sukkah. It is a commercial establishment occupying public property for its own business, potentially at the actual expense and inconvenience of the people for whom the sidewalk was created.

Therefore, the central שאלה is not merely:

“Is this a kosher sukkah?”

The more precise question is:

If a restaurant erects a sukkah on a public sidewalk or street without municipal permission, and the sukkah interferes with the public’s use of that property, may a customer knowingly sit and eat there and recite לישב בסוכה?

Perhaps one could argue that he fulfills the mitzvah בדיעבד. But does that automatically give him the right to make a ברכה?

That is precisely where the distinction becomes significant:

כשרות הסוכה בדיעבד לחוד — וברכת לישב בסוכה לחוד.

The sukkah may be valid enough to fulfill the mitzvah, while the permissibility of making the ברכה of לישב בסוכה may remain an entirely separate halachic question.